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“For the Mutual Benefit of Members 
Thereof”: Attacking Capper-Volstead 




Kyle Kurt was a dairy farmer for eighteen years.1  He owned 
a small herd of Holstein dairy cows, which he milked twice a day, 
365 days a year.2  But with changes in the economy, farming was 
no longer possible as a way of life, and he was forced to auction off 
his herd, his milking equipment, his tractors, and his other farm 
supplies.3 “It’s pretty tough waking up every morning, going to the 
barn, and not being able to pay your bills, especially when you’re 
putting in that many hours,” he said. “Something’s got to change or 
the small farms are going to be gone.”4 
Kyle’s story is, sadly, not unique. Across rural America, small- 
and medium-sized farms are disappearing.5 While there are many 
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 1. Rick Barrett, As Dairy Crisis Crushes Farmers, Wisconsin’s Rural Identity in 
Jeopardy, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Apr. 13, 2018, 10:38 AM), https://www.jsonline.
com/story/money/2018/04/13/dairy-crisis-crushes-farmers-wisconsins-rural-identity-
jeopardy/511881002/ [https://perma.cc/T2UJ-9X8A]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. (quoting dairy farmer Kyle Kurt). 
 5. See U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., 2012 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE HIGHLIGHTS: DAIRY 
CATTLE AND MILK PRODUCTION (Oct. 2014), https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publication
s/Highlights/2014/Dairy_Cattle_and_Milk_Production_Highlights.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/7SDM-X5JT] [hereinafter 2012 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE]. Measuring the size 
of farms is an inexact science. In the dairy industry, relevant measures include cow 
herd headcounts and profits from sales. For the purposes of this Note, small- and 
medium-sized dairy farms are farms making less than $1 million in sales, or farms 
that have fewer than 1,000 cows. James M. MacDonald, Robert A. Hoppe & Doris 
Newton, Three Decades of Consolidation in U.S. Agriculture, ECON. RESEARCH SERV., 
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., 2018, at 1, 8 (Econ. Info. Bulletin No. 189), https://ww
146 Law & Inequality [Vol. 38: 2 
factors contributing to this decline, one factor is undeniable: the 
increasing consolidation of agriculture is making it harder for 
small- and medium-sized farmers to remain viable. Nowhere is this 
trend more manifest than in the dairy industry.6 
Antitrust law should be a check against such consolidation and 
rising inequality.7 However, because the structure of the dairy 
industry is largely carried out through cooperatives, the industry as 
a whole has escaped scrutiny under the Sherman Act and the 
Clayton Act. This lack of attention is due to the Capper-Volstead 
Act.8 Passed in 1922, the Act granted immunity from antitrust 
scrutiny for farmers that organized together to bargain, process, 
and market their agricultural products in cooperatives.9 The 
Capper-Volstead Act was seen as offering farmers countervailing 
power to organize against purchasers and processors and allowing 
them to distribute and market their products more efficiently.10 But 
since 1922, cooperatives have grown into massive organizations, 
with a handful of cooperatives wielding outsized control in the dairy 
markets.11 Despite no longer needing elevated negotiating power, 
these cooperatives remain protected from antitrust scrutiny under 




 6. See DENNIS A. SHIELDS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41224, CONSOLIDATION 
AND CONCENTRATION IN THE U.S. DAIRY INDUSTRY 11 (2010); David A. Domina & C. 
Robert Taylor, The Debilitating Effects of Concentration Markets Affecting 
Agriculture, 15 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 61 (2010) (concluding that concentration exists in 
all major agriculture markets and calling for corrective action); See also Rick Barrett, 
‘Struggling to Tread Water’: Dairy Farmers Are Caught in an Economic System with 
No Winning Formula, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (May 16, 2019, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.jsonline.com/in-depth/news/special-reports/dairy-crisis/2019/05/16/wisc
onsin-dairy-farms-closing-milk-prices-drop-economics-get-tough/3508060002/ [http
s://perma.cc/9Y59-UW8W] (attributing other factors as contributing to the decline of 
the dairy industry: a global surplus of milk, a trade war, and volatile milk prices) 
[hereinafter Barrett, Struggling to Tread Water]. 
 7. See generally Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710 
(2017) (arguing that the increasing inequality in our market demands revival and 
reform in antitrust jurisprudence and policy); Robinson Meyer, How to Fight Amazon 
(Before You Turn 29), ATLANTIC (2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/ar
chive/2018/07/lina-khan-antitrust/561743/ [https://perma.cc/N9SQ-XZVH] (detailing 
the ever-growing school of thought on how the outsized powers of monopolies are 
contributing to growing inequality in the current economy). 
 8. Capper-Volstead Act §§ 1–2, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291–92 (2018). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Christine A. Varney, The Capper-Volstead Act, Agricultural Cooperatives, 
and Antitrust Immunity, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2010, at 1, 2. 
 11. SHIELDS, supra note 6, at 11. 
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Yet, the Capper-Volstead Act does not provide complete 
immunity for agricultural cooperatives. While Capper-Volstead 
litigation has focused on whether the structure or conduct of the 
cooperative falls within the purview of the granted immunity, until 
recently, litigants have often overlooked a small provision in the 
language of the Act. Section 1 of the Act states that for a cooperative 
to receive immunity, it must be “operated for the mutual benefit of 
the members thereof . . . .”12 As cooperatives have accrued more 
control of the dairy industry, and smaller farmers have seen their 
own power diminish, this language provides a powerful tool for 
litigants to pierce the veil of Capper-Volstead protection. 
This Note unfolds in two parts. Part I offers an overview of 
inequality in rural America and the challenges posed by a changing 
dairy industry and cooperative structures to small- and medium-
sized dairy farmers. Next, this section provides background on the 
Capper-Volstead Act, its foundational jurisprudence, and, as a case 
study, the harmful practices of the largest dairy cooperative in the 
United States, the Dairy Farmers of America. Part II considers the 
types of arguments litigants can make to overcome Capper-Volstead 
immunity. By exploring arguments already made by plaintiffs in 
litigation against Dairy Farmers of America, and offering new ones, 
Part II explains three ways potential plaintiffs can show that 
cooperatives have not operated for the “mutual benefit of the 
members . . . .” These methods are (1) arguing that a cooperative’s 
coercive actions have been a detriment to its members, (2) arguing 
that poor governance and management has impeded the 
cooperative from operating for the benefit of its members, and (3) 
demonstrating financial losses due to the cooperative’s actions. 
Pursuing litigation and attacking this language specifically offers 
litigants several advantages for addressing structural inequality in 
the dairy industry. Ultimately, this Note argues that the “mutual 
benefit” language of the Capper-Volstead Act can be a new sword to 
combat the cooperatives that are unfairly using their power to hurt 
small and medium farmers, and therefore, should be exposed to 
antitrust liability.  
 
 12. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (2018) (emphasis added). 
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Part I. Background 
A. Rural Inequality and the Dairy Industry 
Rural America encompasses striking levels of inequality.13 
The rural population has declined steadily since 2010, a trend that 
has only recently begun to reverse.14 Despite the halt in the 
population decrease, 42% of rural counties still witnessed decreased 
net migration between 2012 and 2017.15 Rural Americans are also 
more likely to experience poverty when compared to their urban 
counterparts, and the urban-poverty gap actually increased 
between 2013 and 2017.16 Most troubling, nearly one in four rural 
children are poor, and 61% of all rural counties experience high 
child poverty rates.17 
Increasing inequality in rural America has coincided with the 
decline of agriculture. In February of 2018, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture predicted that net farming income would reach its 
lowest level since 2002, with the median farm income projected to 
be negative $1,316.18 This decline has reverberated harshly in the 
dairy industry; 2018 was the fourth straight year dairy prices were 
below the cost of production.19 In 2018, a gallon of milk cost a farmer 
 
 13. The 2016 election catapulted rural America into the public consciousnesses. 
See, e.g., Chad Shearer, The Small Town-Big City Split that Elected Donald Trump, 
BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2
016/11/11/the-small-town-big-city-split-that-elected-donald-trump/ [https://perma.cc
/GC98-Q6HH] (“The results suggest that metropolitan America is feeling somewhat 
optimistic about its social and economic direction, while small town/rural America is 
increasingly anxious about its future.”); J.D. VANCE, HILLBILLY ELEGY: A MEMOIR OF 
A FAMILY AND CULTURE IN CRISIS (2016) (recounting one man’s life growing up in 
rural Appalachia and shining a light on the plight of rural America). 
 14. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., ECON. INFO. BULLETIN NO. 200, 
RURAL AMERICA AT A GLANCE, 1–2 (2018), https://www.ers.usda.gov/ 
webdocs/publications/90556/eib-200.pdf?v=5899.2 [https://perma.cc/4PHE-FKAV]. 
 15. Id. at 2. 
 16. “The rural poverty rate was 16.4[%] in 2017, compared with 12.9[%] for urban 
areas.” Id. at 5. While Whites make up the majority of those living in poverty in rural 
America, poverty rates still remain higher among racial and ethnic minority groups 
in these areas, especially for Black Americans and Native Americans. Id. 
 17. Tracey Farrigan, Child Poverty Heavily Concentrated in Rural Mississippi, 
Even More So Than Before the Great Recession, ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP’T 
AGRIC. (July 2, 2018), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2018/july/child-
poverty-heavily-concentrated-in-rural-mississippi-even-more-so-than-before-the-
great-recession/ [https://perma.cc/W7Q4-44SH]. 
 18. Siena Chrisman, Is the Second Farm Crisis Upon Us?, CIVIL EATS (Sept. 10, 
2018), https://civileats.com/2018/09/10/is-the-second-farm-crisis-upon-us/ [https://pe
rma.cc/SM76-AFDJ]. 
 19. Id. 
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approximately $1.90 to produce, but farmers only received a sales 
price of $1.35 per gallon.20 Larger farming operations and 
cooperatives can bear the brunt of these price declines, but these 
fluctuations make farming for people like Kyle Kurt unsustainable. 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture reported in January of 2018 
that the total number of dairy farms in the United States had 
dropped 3% in the last year alone, and approximately 17,000 dairy 
farms have closed in the last decade.21 Even in places like 
Wisconsin, where dairy is the lifeblood of many local economies, the 
state lost upwards of 700 dairy farms—almost two a day—in 2018.22 
As it has become increasingly harder for small and medium 
farms to remain viable in the industry, there has been an alarming 
spike in the rate of suicides among farmers. Studies have found that 
farmers experience suicide at rates well above other occupations.23 
Farm advocacy groups are now offering stress management 
seminars for farmers.24 Because this epidemic has become so 
severe, it has even prompted rare, bipartisan responses at the 
federal level.25 
A cause of this growing inequality has been the increasing 
consolidation of the dairy industry across the supply chain. Between 
1987 and 2012, the inventory midpoint for the number of cows on a 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Barrett, Struggling to Tread Water, supra note 6. 
 23. Wendy Jeannette Wehrman Ringgenberg, Trends and Characteristics of 
Occupational Suicide and Homicide in Farmers and Agriculture Workers, 1992–2010 
(May 2014) (unpublished M.S. thesis, University of Iowa) (on file with the University 
of Iowa Library system); see also Nora G. Hertel, ‘Depression Is Part of Your Life’: 
Farmers Get Real on Stress, Mental Health in Minnesota, ST. CLOUD TIMES (Dec. 14, 
2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.sctimes.com/story/news/2018/12/14/farmers-stress-
mental-health-central-minnesota/2274945002/ [https://perma.cc/FG2Q-SLN2] 
(describing how the University of Minnesota Extension program has organized 
workshops aimed at curbing depression and suicide). 
 24. Madison Iszler, Dairy Farmers Struggle with Price Slump, Depression and 
Suicide, TIMES UNION (May 13, 2018), https://www.timesunion.com/news/article/Da
iry-farmers-struggle-with-price-slump-12904574.php [https://perma.cc/9248-5S46]. 
 25. See Nora G. Hertel, Emmer Bill Would Tackle Farmer Suicide, Mental 
Health, ST. CLOUD TIMES (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.sctimes.com/story/news/loc
al/2018/03/14/congressman-emmer-has-proposed-bill-offer-mental-health-programs-
mitigate-farmer-suicides-possibly-j/423513002/ [https://perma.cc/E8EU-2SF3] 
(describing a U.S. House bill that would support local mental health services to 
farmers and ranchers in the United States); Farmers First Legislation Boon for 
Struggling Farmers, WIS. ST. FARMER (Apr. 19, 2018, 3:57 PM), 
https://www.wisfarmer.com/story/news/2018/04/19/farmers-first-legislation-boon-
struggling-farmers/533997002/ [https://perma.cc/6G67-A4AS] (discussing a 
bipartisan bill in the Senate to expand mental health services for farmers). 
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dairy farm grew from 80 to 900 cows.26 In addition, from 2007 to 
2012, the proportion of milk cow inventory on smaller operations 
declined, while the proportion on larger operations increased.27 In 
short, smaller operations became smaller; bigger operations became 
bigger. This concentration is also highly evident in the buyers’ 
market, which includes processors and retail stores.28 For example, 
Dean Foods, a fluid milk processor, controls about 40% of the entire 
fluid milk processing market in the United States.29 Vertical 
strategic alliances are prevalent in several regional markets as 
well, where processors and buyers are entering into exclusive 
supply agreements with certain cooperatives.30 
Additionally, this consolidation has manifested in the 
cooperative model for agricultural business broadly, and with dairy 
cooperatives specifically.31 When the Capper-Volstead Act was 
passed in 1922, most cooperatives were local organizations of 
farmers and of similar size.32 Almost one hundred years later, the 
size of cooperatives would be unimaginable to the drafters of the 
Act. Of the one hundred largest cooperatives in the United States, 
the smallest had revenues in excess of $300 million and assets 
worth $43 million.33 By the 1990s, the volume of products handled 
by cooperatives had grown to $112.2 billion.34 In 2008, the top four 
cooperatives in the United States accounted for 40% of the country’s 
milk production.35 Today, the largest cooperative, Dairy Farmers of 
America, Inc., (DFA) buys milk from 18,000 farmer-members and 
controls almost a third of the nation’s raw milk supply.36 
 
 26. MacDonald et al., supra note 5, at 36. 
 27. 2012 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, supra note 5, at 2. 
 28. HIROMITSU MIYAKAWA, AM. ANTITRUST INST., COMPETITIVE ISSUES IN THE 
DAIRY INDUSTRY: THE PENDING DFA/NDH/HOOD TRANSACTION 10 (2004). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Keri Jacobs, Ag Cooperatives Consolidating, Too, AG DECISION MAKER (Iowa 
State Univ. Extention & Outreach) May 2017, at 3. 
 32. Donald M. Barnes & Christopher E. Ondeck, The Capper-Volstead Act: 
Opportunity Today and Tomorrow, Paper Presented at National Council of Farmer 
Cooperatives’ National Institute on Cooperative Education (Aug. 5, 1997), reprinted 
in U. OF WIS. CTR. FOR COOPERATIVES, http://www.uwcc.wisc.edu/info/capper.html 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180811114231/http://www.uwcc.wisc.edu/info/capper
.html]. 
 33. Peter C. Carstensen, Agricultural Cooperatives and the Law: Obsolete 
Statutes in a Dynamic Economy, 58 S.D. L. REV. 462, 481 (2013) [hereinafter 
Carstensen, Obsolete Statutes]. 
 34. See Barnes & Ondeck, supra note 32. 
 35. SHIELDS, supra note 6, at 11. 
 36. John Burnett, Independent Farmers Feel Squeezed by Milk Cartel, NPR (Aug. 
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Consolidation leaves smaller dairy farmers with little market 
power. First, smaller operations are ill-equipped to endure volatile 
markets for milk, making it nearly impossible for them to operate—
let alone compete—against their larger counterparts.37 Second, 
because dairy cooperatives play such an essential role in the 
marketing and processing of raw fluid milk, independent farmers 
and smaller dairy cooperatives are forced to accept lower prices for 
milk or be frozen out of markets altogether.38 As Nate Wilson, a 
retired farmer and writer for a dairy industry newsletter stated, “co-
ops would battle each other for market share, lowering the price to 
the processor till the processor bought from somebody. It was 
always to the detriment of the farmer.”39 In places like New 
England, some cooperatives have refused to purchase milk from 
small dairy farms if the farmers rejected the cooperatives’ 
purchasing terms, leaving these farmers with no way to bring their 
milk to market.40 
Cooperatives also exert their power over small dairy farms in 
less subtle ways. Often, large cooperatives are vertically integrated 
along the entire supply chain, made up of not just processing or 
bottling plants, but also hauling operations and health code 
inspectors.41 If cooperatives are the sole providers of these essential 
services, they can use access to them as leverage to prevent small 
farmers from leaving the cooperative.42 In some instances, 
cooperatives have used the specter of a health code violation, or 
 
20, 2009), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=112002639 [htt
ps://perma.cc/XGF3-MBCE]. 
 37. Jim Dickrell, Consolidation of Dairy Industry is Changing Market Dynamics, 
FARM J. (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.milkbusiness.com/article/consolidation-of-dairy-
industry-changing-market-dynamics [https://perma.cc/2N7P-996R]. See generally 
Anna-Lisa Laca, The Death of the Mid-sized Dairy, WIS. STATE FARMER (June 14, 
2018), https://www.wisfarmer.com/story/news/2018/06/14/death-mid-sized-dairy/679
979002/ [https://perma.cc/U735-24LJ] (“When it comes to surviving current market 
forces, Covington says large and small [boutique style] farms will be in positions to 
ride the waves, while mid-sized farms will likely be forced out of business.”). 
 38. MIYAKAWA, supra note 28, at 1–2. 
 39. Lela Nargi, What’s Behind the Crippling Dairy Crisis? Family Farmers Speak 
Out, CIVIL EATS (Nov. 5, 2018), https://civileats.com/2018/11/05/whats-behind-the-
crippling-dairy-crisis-family-farmers-speak-out/ [https://perma.cc/L73K-G9LH]. 
 40. See Rebecca Carballo, Cooperative Mergers Reduce Options for Dairy 
Farmers, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.jsonline.com/story/
money/business/2017/02/17/cooperative-mergers-reduce-options-dairy-farmers/9746
1556/ [https://perma.cc/TJ2N-6Y3G]. 
 41. See John Christensen, Dairy Farms in Crisis, Part II, CHRON.-EXPRESS (June 
1, 2018), https://www.chronicle-express.com/news/20180601/dairy-farms-in-crisis-
part-ii [https://perma.cc/6TWJ-YQR4]. 
 42. See id. 
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have arbitrarily administered one, to suppress farmers’ milk prices 
or prevent them from seeking business elsewhere.43 
Whether it be through consolidation, vertical integration, or 
brass-knuckle coercion, the goal of these tactics is for the 
cooperative to amass as much control as possible in a particular 
market. When they do, small farmers have no other choice to bring 
their milk to market and must accept the terms of the cooperative.44 
As a result, cooperatives can set prices artificially low when buying 
from farmers, and extract greater profits when they sell further 
down the supply chain.45 For example, in recent litigation, it came 
to light that a provision in a supply chain agreement between DFA 
and a processor required DFA farmers to sell their raw milk at the 
lowest price in the marketplace.46 
The growing size of these organizations raises questions of 
whether cooperatives are truly accountable to their members. While 
dairy cooperatives are structured to ensure that each member has 
a vote in major decisions affecting the cooperative, when 
membership rolls number in the thousands and span several states, 
experts are worried that the interests of small farms are being 
ignored.47 Additionally, the growing size of cooperatives makes it 
increasingly difficult for members to reign in self-serving 
managerial actions. Unlike large corporations, which are subject to 
accounting systems, information disclosure, auditing, and 
regulation, cooperatives have no mechanisms to ensure 
transparency or that managerial decisions are subject to 
membership approval.48 As a result, cooperatives like DFA have 
frequently acquired interests in processing plants or entered into 
joint ventures which have operated to the detriment of their own 
members, but served as a financial boon for management and 
 
 43. See Leah Douglas, How Rural America Got Milked, NEW FOOD ECON. (Jan. 
18, 2018), https://thecounter.org/how-rural-america-got-milked/ [https://perma.cc/
JPJ6-F9WJ] (“[Dairy Famer Garrett Sitts] charges that milk inspectors controlled 
by his own co-op, Dairy Farmers of America, threatened him and many other farmers 
with health care violations if they dared to raise questions about DFA’s business 
practices.”). 
 44. See id. 
 45. See Andrew Martin, In Dairy Industry Consolidation, Lush Pay Days, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 27, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/28/business/in-dairy-
industry-consolidation-lush-paydays.html [https://perma.cc/VQC4-6C5L]. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See Carballo, supra note 40. 
 48. Carstensen, Obsolete Statutes, supra note 33, at 479–80. 
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business partners.49 Some of these ventures resulted in million 
dollar payoffs for those with close ties to DFA management.50 
Typically, small farmers could turn to the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts’ provisions to counter the harms of consolidation and 
anticompetitive actions. In fact, empirical evidence has shown that 
statutory protections from these kinds of behaviors are much more 
likely to ensure that markets remain competitive.51 However, 
because of the Capper-Volstead Act, many of these cooperatives are 
shielded from such scrutiny. 
B. The Capper-Volstead Act 
The Capper-Volstead Act was born out of the desire to protect 
small farmers. In the late nineteenth century, the cooperative 
model was emerging as a way for individual farmers to negotiate 
against large, rapidly consolidating businesses.52 To gain equal 
footing against these large buyers and to mitigate operation costs, 
farmers started to band together in the processing and marketing 
of commodities.53 However, in 1890, with the passage of the 
Sherman Act, cooperatives were exposed to antitrust liability 
because the law prevented farmers and businesses alike from 
“combining or conspiring” together.54 Indeed, prior to the passage of 
the Capper-Volstead Act, a number of states had brought suits 
against cooperatives under their respective antitrust statutes.55 By 
1922, cooperatives were thriving and prevalent in several 
agricultural sectors.56 Thus, to ensure that cooperatives were 
protected from antitrust scrutiny, Congress passed the Capper-
Volstead Act.57 
The legislative history of the Capper-Volstead Act makes clear 
that Congress sought to restructure the agricultural industry to 
 
 49. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 45. 
 50. See id. 
 51. Peter C. Carstensen, Comments for the United States Departments of 
Agriculture and Justice Workshops on Competition Issues in Agriculture, in LEGAL 
STUDIES PAPER SERIES 2010, at 20–21 (Univ. Wis. Law Sch., Paper No. 1103, 2010). 
 52. Analce Heach Leach, The Almighty Railroad and the Almighty Wal-Mart: 
Exploring the Continued Importance of the Capper-Volstead Act to the American 
Farmer and the Agricultural Marketplace, 32 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 261, 268 
(2010). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 269. 
 55. Carstensen, Obsolete Statutes, supra note 33, at 464. 
 56. Leach, supra note 52, at 271. 
 57. Carstensen, Obsolete Statutes, supra note 33, at 465. 
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benefit farmers and consumers, with the cooperative model as the 
agent of this change.58 Senator Kellogg said in his introduction of 
the bill, “[t]he main object of the cooperative association is to get 
reasonable prices for the farmer, principally through lessening the 
cost of marketing and selling his products and cutting down the 
difference between what the farmer receives and what the public 
finally pays.”59 Legislators intended the Capper-Volstead Act to be 
an important safeguard for farmers and consumers.60 The drafters 
of the Act widely viewed predatory middlemen and buyers as the 
direct cause of the existing market imbalance, exploiting both 
producers and consumers alike. For the 62nd Congress, the Capper-
Volstead Act represented a counterweight against them.61 Lastly, 
the drafters also had a clear vision of who the bill was intended to 
help: small, individual farmers.62 
The Capper-Volstead Act contains only two sections, which 
outline the contours of the granted immunity for cooperatives. 
Section 2 of the Act authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to 
oversee and regulate the conduct of cooperatives if any cooperative 
“monopolizes or restrains trade . . . to such an extent that the price 
of any agricultural product is unduly enhanced.”63 Section 1 of the 
Act defines the mandatory structure of the cooperative in order to 
receive Capper-Volstead immunity.64 First, it limits immunity to 
cooperatives only made up of “persons engaged in the production of 
agricultural products, such as farmers, planters, ranchmen, 
dairymen, nut or fruit growers.”65 Second, these cooperatives may 
“collectively” participate in “processing, preparing for market, 
handling, and marketing in interstate and foreign commerce, such 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. 62 CONG. REC. 2049 (1922). 
 60. Id. 
 61. 62 CONG. REC. 2059 (1922) (Statement of Sen. Capper) (“There is a wide 
margin representing the rake-off of the speculative middleman.”). 
 62. Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 830–31 (1978) 
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“At the time the Capper-
Volstead Act was enacted . . . [t]he economic model was a relatively large number of 
small, individual economic farming units which actually tilled the soil and 
husbanded animals . . . .”); see also 62 CONG. REC. 2257 (1922). 
 63. 7 U.S.C. § 292 (1922). However, the Secretary of Agriculture has never used 
this power. Varney, supra note 10, at 4 n.26. Additionally, the Supreme Court has 
ruled that the Secretary does not have sole jurisdiction over antitrust law 
enforcement in Section 2 of the Act. United States v. Borden, 308 U.S. 188, 204 (1939) 
(rejecting the argument that judicial power cannot be invoked unless the Secretary 
of Agriculture acts). 
 64. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1922). 
 65. Id. 
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products of persons so engaged.”66 However, this conduct is only 
allowed if, “such associations are operated for the mutual benefit of 
the members thereof, as such producers . . . .”67 
Much of the litigation interpreting the Capper-Volstead Act 
has focused on whether the structure of a cooperative meets the 
requirements of Section 1 or whether the conduct of the cooperative 
is not protected by the Act. Courts have strictly interpreted who 
qualifies as a “producer” under the Act. The presence of even one 
non-producer member is sufficient to destroy immunity 
protection.68 Additionally, the case law has not definitively ruled at 
what point a vertically integrated cooperative would fall outside the 
boundaries of the Act. Yet, Justice Brennan, in a concurring 
opinion, suggested that “[a]t some point along the path of 
downstream integration, the function of the [Capper-Volstead] 
exemption for its intended purpose is lost . . . .”69 
The Capper-Volstead Act does not allow for cooperatives to 
achieve market dominance through exclusionary or predatory acts. 
Several court cases have identified behavior from cooperatives that 
will exempt them from Capper-Volstead immunity. In Maryland & 
Virginia Milk Producers Ass’n v. United States, the Supreme Court 
was explicit that “[the Act] does not suggest a congressional desire 
to vest cooperatives with unrestricted power to restrain trade or to 
achieve monopoly by preying on independent producers, processors 
or dealers intent on carrying on their own businesses in their own 
legitimate way.”70 The Court ultimately ruled that activities, like 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. (emphasis added). The rest of Section 1 reads: 
[A]nd conform to one or both of the following requirements: 
First. That no member of the association is allowed more than one vote 
because of the amount of stock or membership capital he may own therein, 
or, 
Second. That the association does not pay dividends on stock or membership 
capital in excess of 8 per centum per annum. 
And in any case to the following: 
Third. That the association shall not deal in the products of nonmembers to 
an amount greater in value than such as are handled by it for members. 
 68. See Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384 (1967) (finding 
that a cooperative was not entitled to immunity because certain members were not 
actual growers but instead private packing houses); see also Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n 
v. United States, 436 U.S. 816 (1978) (holding that a cooperative of chicken growers 
and processors were not entitled to Capper-Volstead protection when some members 
were simply processors). 
 69. Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n., 436 U.S. at 836 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 70. Md. & Va. Milk Producers Ass’n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 466–67 
(1960). 
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attempting to exclude and eliminate non-affiliated cooperatives and 
producers, interfering with truck shipments, and engaging in 
boycotts of particular buyers all fell outside the “‘legitimate objects’ 
of a cooperative.”71 In an Eighth Circuit case, Alexander v. National 
Farmers Organization, the court found that overt attempts at 
boycotting independent purchasers, supply-shorting, and 
purposefully delaying deliveries to independent producers by the 
cooperative’s hauling operation were predatory.72 To date, courts 
have declined to articulate an exact standard to describe what may 
be “exclusionary or predatory conduct.”73  Despite the ambiguity in 
the jurisprudence, courts have consistently interpreted antitrust 
exemption for cooperatives strictly and narrowly.74 
Surprisingly, few courts have interpreted the meaning of the 
language “operated for the mutual benefit of members 
thereof . . . .”75 The most significant discussion has come from the 
Supreme Court in Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc.76 
There, a producer of orange juice alleged conspiracies to restrain 
trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and Sunkist 
countered that their actions were protected under the Capper-
Volstead Act.77 The Court found Sunkist was not entitled to 
immunity because, although constituting a small number of non-
grower members, the makeup of the cooperative did not fall within 
the “quite specific terms to producers of agricultural products.”78 
Sunkist argued that the non-producer members’ participation 
ultimately helped the entire association. This argument was 
rejected by the Court: 
 
[T]he proviso in [Section] 1—“[t]hat such associations are 
operated for the mutual benefit of the members 
 
 71. Id. at 468. 
 72. Alexander v. Nat’l Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1187, 1195–96 (8th Cir. 
1982). But see Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc., 715 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(upholding a cooperative’s use of its market power to boycott certain buyers unless 
they changed their prices). 
 73. Carstensen, Obsolete Statutes, supra note 33, at 487. 
 74. Id. 
 75. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (2018). 
 76. Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384, 393–94 (1967). At 
least one other case has discussed this language, finding that a cooperative having 
ties to a state university extension program did not indicate that the cooperative was 
operating to the mutual benefit of its members. Agritronics Corp. v. Nat’l Dairy Herd 
Ass’n, No. 94-CV-0066, 1994 WL 542203, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1994). 
 77. Case-Swayne, Co., 389 U.S. at 389–90. 
 78. Id. at 393. 
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thereof”— . . . was designed to insure [sic] that qualifying 
associations be truly organized and controlled by, and for, 
producers. In short, Congress was aware that even 
organizations of producers could serve a purpose other than the 
mutual obtaining of a fair return to their members, as 
producers, . . . and the proviso adds a measure of insurance that 
such organizations do not gain the Act’s benefits.79 
 
Even in 1968, the Court contemplated that cooperatives may not 
always operate for the mutual benefit of its own members. 
More recently, two antitrust cases against the dairy industry 
have involved claims of Capper-Volstead immunity and the 
question of whether the cooperatives at issue truly operated for the 
mutual benefit of their members.80 Both cases involved DFA. In the 
first case, In re Southeastern Milk, a group of independent farmers 
and DFA cooperative members brought suit against DFA, Dean 
Foods, and National Dairy Holdings (NDH)  for conspiring to 
depress prices and engaging in anticompetitive behavior.81 
Allegedly, Dean Foods and NDH, the two largest milk bottlers in 
the United States, entered into long-term, full-supply agreements 
with DFA in the Southeastern region of the country.82 In doing so, 
DFA gained access to 77% of the fluid Grade A milk bottling 
capacity in the Southeast, and due to regulatory requirements, all 
DFA members and independent dairy farmers in the region were 
required to dedicate a certain amount of their raw milk supply for 
bottling.83 To exert even more control over the market, DFA 
established the Southern Marketing Agency (SMA), a marketing 
and hauling cooperative, and forced independent farmers to join the 
cooperative in order to gain access to the bottling plants.84 
 
 79. Id. at 393–94 (emphasis added) (quoting Capper-Volstead Act, § 1, 7 U.S.C. 
§ 291 (2018)). 
 80. Other recent antitrust litigation in the dairy industry has also examined 
whether herd retirements of cooperative members constitutes conduct falling outside 
the protections of the Capper-Volstead Act. While the plaintiffs alleged that each 
cooperative at issue had not operated for the “mutual benefit of its members thereof,” 
herd retirement was a residual issue in the litigation, which eventually settled. See 
Class Action Complaint ¶ 100, Edwards v. Nat’l Milk Producers Fed’n, No. 4:11-cv-
4766, 2011 WL 4802918 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2011). But cf. Alison Peck, The Cost of 
Cutting Agricultural Output: Interpreting the Capper-Volstead Act, 80 MO. L. REV. 
451 (2015) (arguing that actions to reduce supply in order to enhance prices are 
protected conduct under the Capper-Volstead Act). 
 81. In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., No. 2:08-MD-1000, 2008 WL 2368212, at *1 
(E.D. Tenn. June 6, 2008). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at *2. 
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Additionally, SMA required the DFA members to pay excessive fees 
and dues through its hauling operations.85 Once Dean, DFA, and 
NDH had gained control of vast amounts of the market, they began 
pooling and flooding substantial quantities of Grade A milk 
produced outside the Southeast into the market with the intent of 
depressing prices.86 
In Allen v. Dairy Farmers of America, Inc., a similar scheme 
was alleged, this time in the Northeast.87 There, DFA attempted to 
assume control of the market by “tying up access to milk bottling 
plants in the Northeastern United States through unlawful 
exclusive supply agreements,” and then coerced independent 
members to join its own marketing agency.88 DFA then fixed 
“artificially low levels” for fluid raw milk prices compared to what 
farmers would have otherwise received in a competitive 
marketplace.89 Moreover, the Allen plaintiffs described in vivid 
detail the ways that DFA and its marketing cooperative, Dairy 
Marketing Services, coerced independent farmers to join the 
cooperative and retaliated against its own members if they sought 
to leave the cooperative.90 These actions included threatening to 
find dubious health code violations on members, imposing 
exorbitant charges on cooperatives or farmers, and entering into 
“unwritten agreement[s]” to not accept the business of farmers in 
other cooperatives.91 
The plaintiffs in Southeastern Milk and Allen have since 
settled their class action suits.92  Interestingly, the plaintiffs in both 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Allen v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 323, 331 (D. Vt. 2010). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Revised Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand 
¶¶ 157, 161–72, Allen v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., No. 5:09-cv-00230-cr, 2011 WL 
1523763 (D. Vt. Apr. 13, 2011) [hereinafter Revised Consolidated Amended Class 
Action Complaint, Allen]. 
 91. Id. Many of these allegations may be borne out soon in litigation. A group of 
the Allen plaintiffs eventually opted out of a settlement agreement with DFA. In 
October of 2019, a district judge in Vermont denied DFA’s motion for summary 
judgment, allowing these plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claims to go to trial. Specifically, 
the judge held a jury could find DFA acquired monopoly power in a “predatory 
fashion,” exempting DFA from Capper-Volstead immunity. Sitts v. Dairy Farmers of 
Am., Inc., No. 2:16-cv-287, 2019 WL 4739533, at *34 (D. Vt. Sept. 27, 2019). 
 92. See Danyll W. Foix, Litigating Capper-Volstead Cases: Developments and 
Insights from Recent Decisions, 4 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEC. AGRIC. & FOOD COMM. E-
BULL. 6–10 (2013), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/ant
itrust_law/at800006_newsletter_2013spring.authcheckdam.pdf 
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cases alleged that the actions taken by DFA, both in their coercive 
acts and attempts to depress the price of milk, precluded the 
possibility of the cooperative operating for the mutual benefit of its 
members.93 But because both cases settled, the courts have not 
ruled on the question of when and how a cooperative may not 
operate for the mutual benefit of its members. 
Part II: Analysis 
The language in Section 1 of the Capper-Volstead Act 
requiring that cooperatives be “operated for the mutual benefit of 
the members thereof” to receive immunity provides fertile ground 
to attack claimed antitrust immunity for powerful cooperatives and 
address the harmful cooperative practices that hurt small and 
medium dairy farms. This Section presents arguments articulated 
by the plaintiffs in Allen and Southeastern Milk, as well as new 
ones. Specifically, potential plaintiffs can, and should, attack 
claimed immunity of cooperatives on three grounds: demonstrating 
that a cooperative has taken coercive actions against its own 
members, that the governance and management of the cooperative 
has not represented the interest of its members, or that the 
cooperative’s actions have resulted in financial losses to its 
members. Furthermore, pursuing litigation against cooperatives 
and undermining claimed immunity on these grounds is an 
advantageous and effective way to address the structural inequality 
that exists in the dairy industry. 
A. Coercive Acts 
One method plaintiffs can use to demonstrate that a 
cooperative is not “operated for the mutual benefit” of its members 
is by arguing that certain coercive acts taken by the cooperative 
against its members are per se violations. As discussed in Allen and 
Southeastern Milk, DFA engaged in a number of coercive practices 
aimed at its own members. Some of these included unspoken 
 
[https://perma.cc/BQQ3-MNVV].  A group of the class members in Allen have since 
decided to continue the suit against DFA. See Sitts, 2019 WL 4739533 at *1. 
 93. See Revised Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, Allen, supra 
note 90, ¶ 269; Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant Southern Marketing Agency’s 
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Failure to State a Claim, at 7–8, 
Scott Dairy Farm, Inc. v. Dean Foods Co., No. 2:07CV00208 58, 2007 WL 4920044 
(E.D. Tenn. Nov. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant Southern 
Marketing Agency’s 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, In re Se. Litig.]. Scott Dairy Farm is 
a case in the Southeastern Milk multidistrict litigation. 
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agreements among competing cooperatives to deny business to non-
members, retaliation against its own members for considering to 
leave, and the imposition of excessive fees and costs on hauling 
operations.94 In arguing these actions per se destroy Capper-
Volstead immunity, plaintiffs can point to the case law defining 
“predatory conduct” from Section 2 of the Act to inform a court’s 
interpretation of the mutual benefit language in Section 1.95 
The “predatory conduct” cases illustrate how coercive 
behaviors against other cooperatives is contradictory to the Capper-
Volstead Act, and that this behavior is not for the mutual benefit of 
its members. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers stands for the 
proposition that actions taken by cooperatives to exclude or 
eliminate producers or cooperative associations through boycotts 
are not Capper-Volstead protected behavior.96 This behavior is 
similar to the “unwritten agreements” into which the DFA entered 
with other cooperatives to ensure that its members could not find 
business elsewhere.97 Additionally, both Maryland & Virginia Milk 
Producers and Alexander castigated the ways the cooperative used 
hauling operations to exert pressure on independent producers and 
cooperatives as unlawful.98 In the cases of Allen and Southeastern 
Milk, hauling operations and excessive costs on producers were 
precisely the ways that DFA retaliated against its own members. 
And, more broadly, it was the vertical nature of DFA’s operation 
itself that ensured compliance from its own members. Just like the 
cooperatives in Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers and Alexander 
used their vertical structure in a predatory fashion, the manner in 
which DFA used its vast vertical structure to leave farmers with no 
other avenues to bring their raw milk to market can be analogized 
to the existing Section 2 jurisprudence. 
Potential defendants will likely counter that this case law can 
only be limited to actions taken by cooperatives against other 
 
 94. Amended Class Action Complaint, Allen, supra note 90, ¶¶ 3, 157, 161–72; 
Corrected Consolidated Amended Complaint at ¶ 3, In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 
No. 2:08-MD-1000, 2008 WL 5190885 (E.D. Tenn. June 6, 2008). 
 95. A common rule of statutory construction is that “[j]ust as a single word 
cannot be read in isolation, nor can a single provision of a statute.” Smith v. United 
States, 508 U.S. 223, 233 (1993). Indeed, the mutual benefit language must be 
informed by the Capper-Volstead Act in its entirety. 
 96. Md. & Va. Milk Producers Ass’n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 468 (1960). 
 97. Revised Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, Allen, supra note 
90, ¶¶ 3, 161–72. 
 98. Md. & Va. Milk Producers, 362 U.S. at 469; Alexander v. Nat’l Farmers Org., 
687 F.2d 1173, 1187, 1195–96 (8th Cir. 1982). 
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cooperatives. But as Justice Black stated in his opinion in Maryland 
& Virginia Milk Producers, the Capper-Volstead Act does not allow 
cooperatives “unrestricted power to restrain trade or to achieve 
monopoly . . . .”99 While these cases examine the behavior of 
cooperatives taken against other cooperatives, the same actions 
taken by DFA are aimed to compel the subservience of its members 
to the cooperative. This behavior restrains trade by preventing 
members from possibly seeking better prices in a different 
cooperative and maintains DFA’s market dominance. These actions 
thrusted exacting costs upon cooperative members in the name of 
preserving the cooperative’s market power. Applying the holdings 
and reasoning from Section 2 “predatory conduct” cases to actions 
taken by cooperatives against their own members is one avenue to 
challenge Capper-Volstead immunity. 
B. Governance Arguments 
Potential plaintiffs should also argue that when the 
management of the cooperative comes at the detriment of individual 
members, the cooperative has not acted for the mutual benefit of 
members and should lose Capper-Volstead immunity. As mentioned 
above, the governance structure of large cooperatives has resulted 
in little transparency and accountability for poor managerial 
decisions.100 Such problematic structures have allowed managers to 
exploit markets, enter into business deals that have questionable 
benefits for producers, and allocate the profits of these exploits to 
themselves and their business partners.101 These kinds of practices 
do not mutually benefit members of the cooperative, and can be 
challenged to show that cooperatives are not entitled to Capper-
Volstead immunity. 
When considering potential antitrust litigation against a 
cooperative, there are several aspects of the cooperative’s 
governance structure plaintiffs should scrutinize to see if 
management decisions or business ventures are truly being made 
in the members’ interest. First, potential plaintiffs should examine 
exactly who is benefiting from the cooperative’s business ventures. 
As was illustrated in Allen, it appeared that a close associate of the 
CEO of DFA earned $100 million for his stake in milk plants, but 
the partner had paid only $6.9 million for the plants two years 
 
 99. Md. & Va. Milk Producers, 362 U.S. at 467. 
 100. See supra Part I; Carstensen, Obsolete Statutes, supra note 33, at 479–80. 
 101. Carstensen, Obsolete Statutes, supra note 33, at 481. 
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earlier.102 Often, these kinds of ventures exploit the investment, 
equity, and debt of the cooperative’s members.103 If management 
cannot justify these kinds of deals, then cooperative management is 
not operating for the mutual benefit of its members and cannot be 
entitled to antitrust immunity. 
Plaintiffs should also examine deals by cooperatives that 
significantly expand their interest in processing plants. The U.S. 
Department of Agriculture does not require that any profits made 
from joint ventures or processing operations go to producer 
members of cooperatives.104 Especially when cooperatives enter 
contracts with processors to offer raw fluid milk from producers at 
the lowest price in the markets, entering such lopsided ventures is 
clearly a detriment to producer members.105 
When cooperatives enter into joint ventures with processors 
for interest in processing plants, management inherently enters 
into a conflict of interest. While the cooperative’s goal is to obtain 
the highest price for its members’ milk, a processor’s interest is to 
obtain the lowest price possible from the producer.106 Given that 
management is not required to share any profits gained in 
processing, management has great incentive to align its interest 
with the processors, rather than the individual members. Indeed, 
DFA’s income from processing comprised 60% of its net income in 
2016, which was not shared with farmer members.107 If this occurs, 
plaintiffs should argue that taking these kinds of significant 
interests in processing plants will ensure the cooperative does not 
operate for the members’ mutual benefit. 
 
 102. Compare Revised Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, Allen, 
supra note 90, ¶¶ 74, 124 (discussing the $100 million payment of the promissory 
note, though other financial information is redacted), with Martin, supra note 45 
(suggesting, through context, although redacted, the same amount of money). 
 103. Revised Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, Allen, supra note 
90, ¶ 184. 
 104. Id. ¶ 189. 
 105. Allen v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 323, 331 (D. Vt. 2010). 
 106. Revised Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, Allen, supra note 
90, ¶ 62. 
 107. Leah Douglas, Farmer’s Case Against Giant Dairy Co-Op Will Go to Trial, 
MEREDITH AGRIMEDIA: SUCCESSFUL FARMING (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.agricult
ure.com/news/business/farmers-case-against-giant-dairy-co-op-will-go-to-trial 
[https://perma.cc/DG4G-827J]. Recently, Dean Foods, the largest milk processor in 
the United States, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. They have since announced they 
are in negotiations with DFA to have the cooperative buy the entire company. Jordan 
Valinsky, America’s Largest Milk Producer Files for Bankruptcy, CNN BUS. (Nov. 12, 
2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/12/business/dean-foods-bankruptcy/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/NM3R-UCKJ]. 
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Moreover, this argument is bolstered by Justice Brennan’s 
concern in National Broiler. In his concurrence, he noted that at a 
certain point of vertical integration by the cooperative, it no longer 
meets its intended purpose under the Capper-Volstead Act.108 
Brennan’s concurrence went to great lengths to discuss the possible 
ramifications of allowing processors, whose sole function is 
processing, to be granted Capper-Volstead immunity. In his 
opinion, this would lead the “behemoths of agribusiness” to accrue 
unfettered power and the “exploitation and extinction” of farmers 
at the hands of “men who control the avenues and agencies” that 
bring milk to market.109 The DFA litigation makes abundantly clear 
that Brennan’s concerns were realized: that vertically integrating 
milk processing and hauling operations led to the “exploitation and 
extinction” of farmers at the hands of the cooperatives. This kind of 
integration, therefore, should exempt these cooperatives from 
Capper-Volstead immunity.110 
As noted earlier, cooperatives—even large cooperatives such 
as DFA—are not required to perform any kind of financial 
disclosure, nor are their managerial decisions subject to member 
approval. This lack of requirement or approval makes accessing 
cooperative business documents difficult. In some cases, 
cooperatives have been outright hostile to allowing members access 
to these documents.111 While the applicable litigation procedure 
seems like a hurdle to making governance arguments against 
Capper-Volstead immunity, it offers the potential for plaintiffs to 
obtain these documents in discovery. Courts have affirmed that 
Capper-Volstead immunity is necessarily a fact-intensive inquiry, 
and thus, if pleadings are sufficient, cannot be adjudicated on 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) grounds.112 Therefore, if 
plaintiffs reach discovery, these documents can be accessed. 
 
 108. Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 834–36 (1978) 
(Brennan, J., concurring). 
 109. Id. at 834–35 (quoting 62 CONG. REC. 2058 (1922)). 
 110. But see David P. Clairborne, The Perils of the Capper-Volstead Act and Its 
Judicial Treatment, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 263 (2002) (arguing that the Capper-
Volstead Act would permit vertically integrated processors to be immune from 
antitrust scrutiny). 
 111. Revised Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, Allen, supra note 
90, ¶ 190. 
 112. Foix, supra note 92, at 8. 
164 Law & Inequality [Vol. 38: 2 
C. Showing Pecuniary Losses 
Finally, plaintiffs can show that both coercive actions and 
governance problems that result in financial losses to members 
illustrate that the cooperative is not being operated for the 
members’ mutual benefit. Prime examples are the actions taken by 
DFA in the Allen and Southeastern Milk cases. In both cases, the 
plaintiffs alleged that supply agreements that DFA entered into 
with milk bottling processors ultimately resulted in depressed 
prices for raw milk.113 The plaintiffs intended to present expert 
witnesses illustrating the actual financial losses experienced by 
members from the actions.114 To explain hauling contracts or effects 
from consolidation, plaintiffs can admit expert testimony to 
illustrate how they suffered financial losses because of these 
actions, and therefore, defendants are not acting for the mutual 
benefit of the cooperative’s members. Finally, following the DFA 
merger in Allen, where the cooperative took out a significant 
interest in a number of processing plants, the plaintiffs had 
demonstrated exactly how this deal hurt their members’ financial 
interest. Over the alleged antitrust period, the plaintiffs 
demonstrated that the price for raw fluid milk declined, while 
processors’ margins saw gains over the same period.115 
D. Mutual Benefit Language and Litigation as a Preferred 
Strategy to Address Inequality in the Dairy Industry 
Using mutual benefit language to litigate antitrust claims 
against cooperatives is advantageous for several reasons. First, 
given the dearth of case law interpreting the language, it provides 
space for creative arguments and allows litigants to mold claims to 
address truly egregious practices of cooperatives, like coercive 
hauling contracts, discrimination based on the size of farmers, and 
price manipulation. Second, litigants have a statutory 
interpretation advantage against cooperatives, in that exemptions 
from antitrust laws must be construed narrowly.116 Finally, it is a 
measured way to pursue antitrust violations against the 
 
 113. See Revised Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, Allen, supra 
note 90, ¶¶ 3–4, 30; Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant Southern Marketing Agency’s 
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, In re Se. Litig., supra note 93, at *1, *7–9.  
 114. In re Se. Milk, No. 2:08-MD-1000, 2012 WL 1981511, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. June 
1, 2012). 
 115. Revised Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, Allen, supra note 
90, ¶ 193. 
 116. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 126 (1982). 
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cooperatives. Cooperatives are an indispensable part of the dairy 
industry, and more often than not, truly represent the interests of 
their members.117 Some have even proposed the use of cooperatives 
as a way to combat monopoly power.118 Challenging cooperatives 
through this language can ensure that only cooperatives that truly 
act against the interests of their members are denied Capper-
Volstead immunity. 
Also, litigation as a strategy to remedy this inequality is much 
more achievable than the alternative of pursuing change through 
the political arena. Since the 1970s, the Department of Justice has 
frequently re-examined the utility of the Capper-Volstead Act to 
meet the current realities of the dairy industry. Each time, the 
Capper-Volstead Act remained untouched.119 In fact, when the U.S. 
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust went so far as to say that 
“an examination of whether the law is serving its intended purposes 
may lead to a conclusion that it is not the right law for the state of 
the industry at this time,”120 she was met with a “tsunami” of 
pushback from farmers and legislators.121 Additionally, reform at 
the local level is unlikely to seriously address the challenges posed 
by large cooperatives, given that many cooperatives now span 
several states.122 The “iconic status” of the Capper-Volstead Act 
among politicians and farmers alike makes policy changes 
effectively untenable.123 
Some may argue that the dearth of case law interpreting the 
meaning of the mutual benefit language demonstrates that this 
part of the Capper-Volstead Act is inconsequential. That is simply 
not the case. The structure of Section 1 of the Act makes clear that 
“operat[ion] for the mutual benefit” of producers, even though not 
explicitly enumerated, is a required element to receive Capper-
 
 117. See Douglas, supra note 43 (illustrating how Westby Cooperative Creamery 
has sustained the rural, local economy). 
 118. See Sandeep Vaheesan & Nathan Schneider, Cooperative Enterprise as an 
Antimonopoly Strategy, 124 PENN ST. L. REV. 1 (2019). 
 119. Kenneth R. O’Rourke & Andrew Frackman, The Capper-Volstead Act 
Exemption and Supply Restraints in Agricultural Antitrust Actions, COMPETITION: 
J. ANTITRUST & UNFAIR COMPETITION L. SECTION ST. B. CAL., Fall 2010, at 69, 71–
72. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Carstensen, Obsolete Statutes, supra note 33, at 496. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 462–63. 
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Volstead protection.124 The legislative history of the Act and its 
subsequent jurisprudence reinforce this notion. 
The legislative history of the Capper-Volstead Act shows that 
it was intended to protect small, individual producers from greedy 
“middlemen.” One express concern during the bill’s debate was that 
individual farmers were prone to financial exploitation, and 
therefore, organizing in this manner would improve their market 
position.125 The mutual benefit language ensured that individual 
producers would truly reap the benefits of the cooperative, not 
suffer at its hands. Indeed, the legislative history demonstrates that 
some current-day cooperative management would almost certainly 
draw the ire of the Capper-Volstead Act’s drafters. One Senator 
stated during the bill’s deliberations that “a policy cannot always 
exist under which those who toil must toil at a loss and contribute 
to those who neither toil nor spin, but sit in their palaces at 
mahogany desks and draw in the rake-off in the shape of a 
middleman’s profit.”126 During the time of the allegations against 
DFA, its CEO made $31.6 million during his seven-year tenure.127 
Moreover, the case law has paid special attention to the 
original intent of the Act to protect small farmers. In National 
Broiler, Justice Brennan stated “[i]t was the disparity of power 
between the units at the respective levels of production that spurred 
this congressional action.”128 As Justice Marshall laid out in his 
majority opinion in Case-Swayne, the statute was crafted with 
small dairy farmers in mind: “qualifying associations [should] be 
truly organized and controlled by, and for, producers.”129 The Court 
realized that the drafters were well-aware that cooperatives could 
potentially operate for interests other than “the mutual obtaining 
of a fair return to their members . . . .”130 While perhaps the drafters 
did not contemplate that the management of cooperatives would 
generate upwards of $31.6 million in salaries and pursue deals 
largely to enrich management and shareholders,131 the purpose of 
the Act is unequivocal. The Act was meant to help protect the model 
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of “small, individual, economic farming units,” and the mutual 
benefit language embodies that sentiment.132 Thus, the language is 
an indispensable provision of the Act and can be the basis for 
valuable litigation. 
Litigating under this clause, however, is not without 
challenges. Namely, if some members of a cooperative want to 
pursue litigation against the entity, but others do not, the 
proposition that the cooperative has not operated for the mutual 
benefit of its members could be undermined. Justice Harlan raised 
a similar concern in Case-Swayne, where he expressed concern that 
imposing the harsh punishments of antitrust violations against 
cooperatives would ultimately burden the individual members 
themselves.133 
These concerns can be addressed procedurally. Both 
Southeastern Milk and Allen ultimately certified classes against the 
defendants. In Allen, the court simply certified two subclasses of 
DFA class members: those who believed that DFA was subject to 
antitrust scrutiny and members with “divergent interests.”134 And 
while some class members may disagree with the claims, the court 
in Southeastern Milk appeared to be open to still finding the 
cooperative had not operated for members’ mutual benefits.135 The 
plaintiffs during the class certification phase proffered witness 
testimony that the cooperatives ultimately affected all members.136 
The court held “[i]f plaintiffs can prove at trial that all members of 
the DFA subclass have been equally harmed by illegal acts 
committed by the defendants, the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) are 
met.”137 
Conclusion 
The mutual benefit language of the Capper-Volstead Act offers 
potential grounds to challenge antitrust immunity claimed by 
cooperatives. Rural America is facing unprecedented levels of 
inequality. As small and medium dairy farms are disappearing, so 
is the profound sense of identity and the lifeblood of many rural 
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communities. Increasing consolidation and the outsized power of 
large cooperatives are in part to blame. One way to combat this 
trend is through increased antitrust action and challenging claimed 
immunity under the Capper-Volstead Act. For this immunity to be 
granted, cooperatives must demonstrate that they operate for the 
mutual benefit of members. Plaintiffs should utilize this overlooked 
language to pierce the veil of immunity. They can do so by 
challenging coercive actions taken by cooperatives against their 
members, scrutinizing misguided governance decisions, and 
demonstrating financial losses caused by cooperative actions. 
Pursuing litigation with this language poses several advantages for 
litigants, as well. Ultimately, this language can be a tool to protect 
those who depend on their modest herds and humble plots to make 
a living and ensure that a vanishing way of life is not lost forever.  
